Due to the rapid growth of the network application, new kinds of network attacks are endlessly emerging.
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of Internet, the security relevant incidents have shown an exponential in crease. In addition, cracking technology has evolved into complex approach such as coordinated attacks and cooperative attacks (Li et aI., 2004) . Under these circumstances, software tools, that can automatically detect a variety of intrusions, are of a compelling need. Standing as a gatekeeper of network, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) must have the ability to de tect and defend intrusions more proactively in short period.
Intrusion detection techniques are largely classi fied into two areas: misuse detection and anomaly detection (Denning, 1987) . Indeed, misuse detection systems (Denning, 1987) use patterns of well known attacks or weak spots of the system to match and iden tify known intrusions. As example of such systems, we cite the network IDS SNORT (Roesch, 1999) . SNORT is configured using a database of signatures which characterize network packets that are poten tially malicious. Using this database, SNORT mon itors a network connection and logs all occurrences of network packets that match any of the configured signatures. However, misuse detection techniques, in general, are not effective against novel attacks that have no already matched rules or patterns (Denning, 1987) . On the contrary, the anomaly detection sys tems flag activities, that significantly deviate from the established normal usage profiles as abnormal or in other words as intrusions. Anomaly detection tech niques have been shown to be effective against un known or novel attacks, since no prior knowledge about specific intrusions is required. Nevertheless, the main moan that can be addressed to the anomaly detection systems is that they tend to generate more false alarms than do misuse detection systems, i. e., an anomaly can be simply a new normal behavior (Den ning, 1987) .
IDS are also traditionally classified as ei ther network-based or host-based (Denning, 1987) . Network-based systems monitor the network traffic and inspect packet transmissions for suspicious be havior (Denning, 1987) . Host-based systems operate on single hosts, and operate on low-level system data, such as patterns of system calls, file access, or pro cess usage (Denning, 1987) . They can monitor for suspicious behavior, or they can scan configurations to detect potential vulnerabilities.
Most of the current IDS use centralized architec tures made of individual host and network monitors along with a centralized controller component (Spaf ford and Zamboni, 2000) . The network monitors send intrusion data to the centralized controller compo nent that performs analysis of the information it re ceives from each of the monitors (Spafford and Zam boni, 2000) . Worth of mention that conventional ap proaches to intrusion detection, involving a central unit to monitor an entire system, have several draw backs (Jansen et aI., 1999; Spafford and Zamboni, 2000) . Indeed, the procession of all the information at a single host implies a limit on the size of the network that can be monitored. Likewise, the additions of new hosts increase significantly the load on the cen tralized controller. Consequently, the centralized IDS suffers from scalability problems (Spafford and Zam boni, 2000) . In addition, the communication with the central components can overload parts of the network. Thus, the designed feature of communication and co operation between a centralized IDS components are badly missing. This fact hampers the capability to ef ficiently detect large-scale distributed attacks (Spaf ford and Zamboni, 2000).
As accuracy is the essential requirement for an IDS, its extensibility and adaptability are also criti cal in today's network computing environment. Con sidering the growth of the network, it is necessary that the IDS be able to resist attacks on themselves and also needed to be fault tolerant, highly adapt able and configurable (Mosqueira-Rey et aI., 2009). Given these characteristics, agent-based technology seemed to be an appropriate alternative for developing IDS (Mosqueira-Rey et aI., 2009). In this respect, the agent is a software entity that operates continuously and autonomously in a particular environment, and is able to carry out activities in a flexible and intelligent manner (Herrero and Corchado, 2009) . Therefore, the agent-based technology can improve the means of ap plying detection techniques (Mo et aI., 2009) . For example, the agents could be deployed at different user computers to collect data as well as they could provide an interface to user application systems for smooth integration. Consequently, the agents were applied within an IDS could provide a good mech anism for implementation of intrusion detection on network-based application systems (Mo et aI., 2009 ).
Particularly, the deficiency of the centralized IDS naturally leads us to the idea of using the mobile agent technology (Jansen et aI., 1999) . Indeed, the mobile agents reduce the network bandwidth consumption by moving the data analysis to the location of the intru sion data. Besides, they support heterogeneous plat forms, and offer a lot of flexibility in creating a dis tributed IDS. Whenever, an intruder tries to disable the single point in a network, i. e the central analyzer.
If the latter is disabled, the entire network becomes without protection (Ktata et aI., 2009) . In this case, a mobile agent-based IDS allows to palliate the draw back of central point of failure, since there is no cen tral station. In addition, the implementation of the mobile agents within languages such as JAVA pro vides mobile agent with system and platform indepen dence and considerable security features, which are a necessity in IDS (Mo et aI., 2009) .
Tn this paper, we investigate another way of tack ling the issues within the centralized IDS. Thus, we introduce a novel distributed IDS, called Distributed Intrusion Detection using Mobile Agents and Snort (OIDMAS). OIDMAS focuses on the use of the above-mentioned beneficial features offered by the mobile agent technology for detecting intrusion in network-based application systems. It provides an op tion for setting up a misuse distributed network IDS by integrating a component of the well-known net work IDS SNORT. The proposed system permits the data collection, the filtration, the detection of known intrusions using a database of signature-based rules and the response. The specific objectives of OlD MAS are as follows:
(i) A new mechanism was designed for acquiring data about user action from client machines or from access control module in server applications.
It provides a distributed IDS that reduces the con gestion within the network;
(U) Current IDS include many sensors distributed over the network and a centralized management station. These systems cause many bottlenecks and they suffer from the problem of single point of failure; DIDMAS exploits the benefits of employing mo bile agents such as reduced network bandwidth, in creased flexibility and ability to operate within het erogeneous environments. Through extensive carried out experiments on real life network traffic, we show the effectiveness of our proposal in terms of (i) the scalability-related criteria such as network bandwidth and system response time; and (ii) the IDS perfor mance.
The remaining of the paper is organized as fol lows. Section 2 presents the basics of mobile agents. We list the advantages of mobile agent-based IDS in section 3. Section 4 sheds light on some related re search in mobile agent-based IDSs. We introduce our new distributed intrusion detection system based on the mobile agent technology in Section 5. The in teraction between the agents is thoroughly discussed in Section 6. We also relate the encouraging results of the carried out experiments in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes and points out avenues of future work.
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THE MOBILE AGENTS
The software agents can be treated as mobile agents, as they are able to migrate from one computer to an other one (Herrero and Corchado, 2009) .
Useful characteristic of mobile agents are as fol lows (Jansen et aI., 1999 ):
• Autonomy: the agents are independently running entities. Thus, they can operate without human control;
• Mobility: the agents are able to suspend process ing on one platform and to move to another one where they resume execution. In particular, the mobility is the most important feature of the mo bile agent for the following reasons (Outtagarts, 2009) :
Persistence: Whenever a mobile agent is launched, it is no longer connected to its cre ator machine. It still works even in the failure of the machine that initiated them;
-Peer to Peer Communication: A failure in the paradigm of client/server is the inability of servers to communicate. The mobile agents are considered peer entities and, as such, can act as either client or server is like; -Fault Tolerance: Within the client/server tech nology, the transaction state is generally di vided between the client and the server. In the case where one server is down, then the client can resume the situation and re-synchronize with the server because the network connec tion is lost. However, since the mobile agent do not need to keep the connection permanently, in case of network failure it will continue to run on the node.
• Rationality: the agents embody the capacity to analyze and solve a problem in a rational manner;
• Reactivity: the agents perceive their environment and adapt their behavior in a dynamic way to match, as soon as possible, the new environment parameters;
• Inferential Capability: the agents are able to share a set of knowledge in order to achieve a spe cific goal;
• Pro-activeness: the agents can decide to adapt their behavior to their environment;
• Social Ability: the agents are able to meet and in teract with other agents. The interaction and col laboration between agents is achieved by an Agent Communication Language (ACL).
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ADVANTAGES OF USING MOBILE AGENTS IN INTRUSION DETECTION
The use of mobile agents for intrusion detection of fers a new approach to the traditional IDS method ology (Jansen et aI., 1999) . With the new capabil ity of mobility for intrusion detection, several advan tages related to mobile agent usage are listed in litera ture (Jansen et ai., 1999; Ktata et ai., 2009 ). Some of them are listed as follows:
• Delay Caused by Networks. Whenever the hi erarchical IDS's are used in a network, it results in slower response when an attack occurs. This fact is due to the central controller, which sends the information about the attack and the decision to be taken to particular host through the network. This may not always result in an immediate re sponse against the attack, as the time taken for the information to reach the destination host might be too long. Consequently, the traditional hierarchi cal IDS are not successful in reducing the detec tion delay. On the contrary, whenever the mobile agents are used, the IDS can respond faster as they are directly dispatched from the central controller to the target host;
• Minimizing the Network Traffic. Traditional IDS employed different data collection mecha nisms to collect data both at the host and the net work level. Moreover, the central controller uses the collected data to track any intrusions. Gen erally, the data collected from different hosts is very huge. This results in increasing the network traffic and creating an overhead on the network. By employing the mobile agents, the load on the network can be reduced. The minimization of the load on the network can be explained by the efficient search mechanisms used by the mobile agents, which reduce the necessity for data traffic among several hosts;
• Persistency. Although the mobile agents operate autonomously and asynchronously, they are not prone to failure even if the machine, which hosted them, fails. This fact provides additional ad vantage of employing mobile agents within IDS. Whenever the central controller of the centralized machine fails, then the entire IDS is considered to be down as there is no communication among other hosts;
• Structure and Platform Independence.
The mobile agents can be used in IDS with a flexible structure. For example, one agent can be responsi ble for collecting the data in the network, the other agent can be used to detect and report anomalies while the rest of them can be used to take appro priate action. Due to this structure, the mobile agents find tremendous applications in IDS;
• Dynamic Nature. The dynamic nature of mobile agents enables them to be moved around the net work. Consequently, it is possible to also recon figure the system during runtime. Moreover, the mobile agents can be cloned, dispatched or put to sleep when the network configuration has to be changed. Therefore, they can sense their ex ecution environment and dynamically adapt to the situation;
• Heterogeneous Environment.
The mobile agents can be inter-operable on multiple plat fonns, since the virtual interpreter is installed on the host machine. Generally, the mobile agents are transport-layer independent and depend only on the execution environment. This feature en ables the mobile agents to be used on several dif ferent platforms without compatibility problems;
• Robust in Nature. Even if one of the agents fails, the other agents in the IDS can take up the tasks of the failed agent and continue the detection. This robust behavior of mobile agents makes them more applicable within large environments where several agents and their interaction is needed for proper monitoring of the network;
• Scalability. By employing the distributed mo bile agent-based IDS, however large the network grows, it could be easily handled. In this respect, the mobile agents have the capability to clone and distribute themselves to the new machines when ever they are added to the network.
THE MOBILE AGENT-BASED IDS
The applicability of the multi-agent technology and the mobile agents to intrusion detection has been explored in several approaches. One of the well known multi-agent-based IDS is the Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection (AAFID) (Spafford and Zamboni, 2000) . Within this architecture, a set of agents monitors specific aspects of a machine re quiring security. These agents send information to the transceivers, which in turn, amalgamate the infor mation and re-send it to the monitors. The monitors process this information and decide whether or not an attack has occurred. To make the system more scal able, the monitors may be built in layers. Although this system was very innovative in its time, its main drawback is the extreme rigidity of its architecture, as this makes the introduction of new agents very com plicated. Moreover, its hierarchy is such that if an at tack manages to deactivate an agent in the upper lay ers, the entire system might be deactivated.
The key differentiating factor between the AAFID approach and the mobile agent-based approaches is the mobility of the agents participating in the IDS. Many proposed IDS have explored the advantages of the mobility aspect of mobile agents in the context of intrusion detection.
One of the studies worth of mention was the MA IDS architecture, proposed in (Li et aI., 2004) . The MA-IDS system employed mobile agents to coordi nately process information from each monitored host. Its architecture includes the Assistant and the Re sponse mobile agents. The Assistant mobile agent is dispatched by the manager component to gather in fonnation in the network. The mobile agents within the MA-IDS system are capable of evading attack ers and resurrecting themselves if they are attacked. Moreover, the mobility of agents makes it possible that distributed intrusion can be detected by means of data correlation and cooperative detection. How ever, whenever the location of manager were found by attackers, the IDS becomes in a dangerous situ ation. Thus, MA-IDS suffers from the drawback of single point of failure.
The APHIDS architecture (Agent-Based Pro grammable Hybrid Intrusion Detection System), pro posed by (Deeter et aI., 2004) , represents a varia tion of the existing mobile agent-based approaches (with some similarities to the MA-IDS system). It shares a common goal of exploiting the mobility of the agents to perform distributed correlation. It dif fers, however, in the mechanism by which these mo bile agents are coordinated and combined. APHIDS provides a scripting capability that aims to automate evidence gathering tasks that system administrators would otherwise perform manually. It also attempts to utilize and integrate existing IDS technologies, i.e., SNORT. In this respect, APHIDS allows to realize the scalability of mobile agent-based approaches, and ad dresses flexibility, extensibility, and delay limitations. Whereas, the virtualization and the serialization rou tines required for agent mobility cause performance overhead that may be significant without proper de sign consideration.
Wang et al. proposed a distributed IDS, which in cludes: a Manager and a Host monitor (Wang et al., 2006) . The components in such model are designed as mobile agents for the purpose of high adaptability and security of the system. It is claimed that the mo bile agents of the proposed system can evade intrusion and recover by themselves if they suffer from intru sion. Nevertheless, the system uses a control center to carry out the major part of the intrusion detection. Consequently, if the location of this center is discov ered, then the system collapses.
In (Singh and Sodhi, 2007) , the authors pre sented a distributed IDS that comprises three different agents, called, respectively: Roaming, Supervisor and Action agents. In fact, a roaming agent moves to pre defined host to collect data. The supervisor also acts as evaluator that takes the decision whether suspicious activity is detected at a particular host and alerts with the help of action agent.
Mo et al. implemented a misuse mobile agent based IDS (Mo et al., 2009) , which incorporates the SNORT system (Roesch, 1999) . The architecture con sists of three different components: (1) an intrusion detection processor (IDP), (2) a mobile agent plat form (MAP), and (3) distributed sensors or sniff er.
Indeed, the IDP is responsible for monitoring network segments. Beside, the MAP is responsible for accept ing requests made by the IDP and generating mobile agents as well as sending them into the network to start sniffing activities within the local network, to stop it when necessary, and to send the collected data to the IDP for further analysis. Finally, the sniffer is responsible for gathering data. The mobile agents in this work are fully managed and network resources utilization is saved when there is no attack. However, the proposed system suffers from a high false positive rate, since many attacks could be missed.
Recently, Ye et al. (Ye et aI., 2009 ) introduced a distributed IDS based on the mobile agent technology and the open source tool SNORT. The proposed sys tem permits data collection, analysis and response on the supervisory node and the results are analyzed by mobile agent. Therefore, the central server has to take down the intrusion behavior and manage components, since most computation is distributed to the supervi sory nodes. In fact, the proposed system palliates the drawback caused by the excessive flow within the sys tem processing center.
Due to its usability and importance, detecting the distributed intrusions still a thriving and a compelling issue. In this respect, the main thrust of this paper is to propose a new distributed IDS called Distributed Intrusion Detection using Mobile Agents and Snort, DIDMAS, which is based on the mobile agents and integers an existing signature database. The main idea behind our approach is to address limitations of cen tralized current IDS systems by taking advantage of the mobile agent paradigm. Specifically, we address the following limitations of conventional centralized approaches:
• The bandwidth scalability. The bandwidth re quired to collect large, distributed network data sets from distributed sensors can pose a significant overhead cost, affecting network performance;
• The processing scalability. The processing capa bility of the centralized approach is limited by the computational power of a single analysis center, even though other resources may be available;
• The analysis delay. Within the centralized ap proach, the huge network traffic causes a long analysis delay. However, the long delays can ham per a timely and effective response.
THE DIDMAS SYSTEM
The distributed structure of DID MAS is composed of different cooperative, communicant and collaborative agents for collecting and analyzing massive amounts of network traffic, called respectively: Sniff er, Fil ter, Misuse Detection and Reporter Agent. Figure 1 sketches the overall architecture of DID MAS.
The processing steps of DIDMAS can be summa rized as follows:
I. The Sniffer Agent is the first agent that connects to the network and gathers the packets. It has the capability to clone and distribute itself to the new machines whenever it connects to the network. It creates the Filter Agents and the Misuse Detection Agents and sends them toward the station to be analyzed;
2. The gathered packets are send to the Filter Agent which filters them;
The Misuse Detection Agent is a mobile agent.
Based on a knowledge base containing the SNORT signatures, this latter analyzes the Filter Agent output. Whenever an attack is detected, then an alert is sent to the Reporter Agent;
4. Finally, the Reporter Agent is a stationary agent. It generates the reports and logs.
Each of these agents is individually described in the following subsections. 
The Sniffer Agent
A sniffer is a device that is able to intercept and log traffic passing over a network. It allows the capture of each packet and, if needed, it analyzes its con tent. The traffic can be IP, IPX, or AppleTalk network packets. In general, the sniffing can be used to: i) analyze network problems; ii) detect network intru sion attempts; and iii) documenting regulatory com pliance through logging all perimeter and endpoint traffic; etc.
The Sniffer Agent is the first agent to work in the DIDMAS system. It captures the incoming packets by reading them from the network card in the ma chine and caches them in the memory at the interval of every 5 seconds. The benefits of this kind of agents include: i) the cloning and the distribution throughout the network; and ii) the duplication in order to lighten the network charge. Finally, the captured packets will be the input of the next agent, i.e., the Filter Agent.
The Filter Agent
A distributed IDS must undertake to analyze a huge volumes of events collected from different sources around the network. Consequently, the Filter Agent filters the packets already captured by the Sniffer Agent. It will treat these crude packets by achieving the following tasks:
• Distinguish the various fields of the packets col lected in crude such as destination address and the protocol;
• Sort the packets by the category of packets (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.) concerned by a specific kind of intrusion.
The Filter Agent performs its tasks as a pretreat ment phase, which precedes the analysis phase carried out by the following agent.
The Misuse Detection Agent
This kind of agent processes and analyzes the pack ets firstly captured by the Sniffer Agent and then pre processed by the Filter Agent. In fact, it searches for intruder signatures in these packets. Hence, if there is a similarity between the filtered packets and in truder signatures, then an intrusion is detected. Con sequently, the agent raises an alert to the Reporter Agent.
The knowledge of the Misuse Detection Agent is represented in rules that are based on intruder signatures. These rules are from the well-known signature-based IDS SNORT System (Roesch, 1999) . Although the agent developed is based on the SNORT rules, it uses the efficient pattern-matching RETE al gorithm (Forgy, 1982) and tailored to the JAVA lan guage. The latter adapts RETE to an object-oriented interface and allows for more natural expression of rules with regard to domain objects.
SNORT (Roesch, 1999) is the foundation stone of open source network based IDS. It offers a lightweight, efficient and flexible intrusion detection engine with a complete intrusion signature rule set. It analyzes the packets that arrive to the network inter face, trying to match their characteristics with those contained in the rules stored in its rule base. If a spe cific packet matches the premises of any rule, this rule is executed and a specific action is generated to give notice of this fact. Thus, each rule has the following structure:
1. Rule Header. Contains the basic information about the rule, including:
a Rule Action. The action that will be taken when rule conditions are met. The main ac tions are: alert (generate an alert), log (log the packet) and pass (ignore the packet). b Protocol. The protocols used by the packet be ing analyzed. Currently, SNORT understands the following protocols: IP, TCP, ICMP and UDP.
c Source Information. IP address and port of the source computer from where the packet origi nated. [t is also possible to use the key word 'any' to apply the rule on all packets irrespec tive of the IP address or port number. d Destination Information. [P address and port of the destination computer in the packet. The keyword 'any' can be used again with the same meaning as before.
2. Rule Option. Contains alert messages and infor mation on the parts of the packet that should be inspected to determine if the rule action should be taken.
As an example, one possible SNORT rule could be: This rule will generate an alert containing the mes sage "F TP passwd attempt" each time a packet using the TCP is detected for any external source [P address and port, and port destination 21 on the local network. Along our study, we use the signature database of SNORT version 2.3.2, which provides more than 2648 signatures. Those signatures are stored in a MySQL database.
The Reporter Agent
The Misuse Detection Agent reports its findings to the Reporter Agent which transmits them to the adminis trator. Whenever an intrusion is detected, it will send an alert to the system administrator. This alert can be a message on the screen or a message to a centralized machine or an alert file.
INTER ACTION BETWEEN AGENTS
The agents use the ACL (Agent Communication Lan guage) language to communicate. Moreover, the in formation transmitted among agents is sent as text messages and the process complies with the F[PA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) 1 proto cols. Within the DIDMAS architecture, agents can communicate in two ways: It must open one channel to communicate with it. Once the communication channel is created, they exchange messages.
(ii) Second, called "local communication". In this communication mode, the agent X which must re ceive information, will be deployed on the host where agent Y is. Thus, the exchanges are local and do not create large network load. As soon as an agentX has received the expected information, it can come back on the last host, remain on the same host (as Y) or move to a third host.
The D[DMAS uses several agent's group (sniffing, filtering, analyzing, reporting). Some of these agents need high communication, with rich in formation, and others just need to share a reduced amount of information.
Worth of mention is to highlight that our system DIDMAS improves sharing distributed resources. It performs their tasks over any number of hosts in the network. Each host can receive any number of agents that monitor all events occurring within it.
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to assess the overall performance of DID MAS in a realistic scenario, a prototype of the pro posed architecture was implemented using Sun's Java Development Kit 1A.1, the well known platform JADE 3.7, the Eclipse and the JPCAP 0.7. JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) 2 is a software Framework, which simplifies the imple mentation of multi-agent systems. The agent plat form can be distributed by moving agents from one machine to another one.
[n addition, JPCAP (Java library for CAP turing and sending network Packets) 3 is an open source li brary for capturing and sending network packets.
All experiments were carried out on equivalent machines equipped with a 3GHz Pentium [V and 2GB of main memory running under Linux Fedora Core 6.
Through the carried out experiments, we have a twofold aim: first, we focus on the assessment of the scalability-related criteria such as network bandwidth and system response time. Second, we have to stress on evaluating the performance of our proposed system in terms of detection and false positive rates. During the evaluations, we compare the results of the DID MAS system vs. that of SNORT.
[n this respect, we used machines that were con nected via a switch, thus forming a switched network.
For a realistic testing environment, attacks needed to be interjected into a volume of network traffic. Con sequently, we simulated attacks using the well known tool Metasploit 4 version 3.5.l. Metasploit is both a penetration testing system and a development plat form for creating security tools. [t is used by the se curity researchers world-wide to test an IDS. The de scription of the eight different attack types used in the evaluation is shown in Table 1 . [t is known that two of the most important elements of net work performance are bandwidth and analysis delay. On the one hand, the bandwidth is the transmission capacity of the network, usually measured in bits per second. On the other hand, the analysis delay is the amount of time it takes for a packet to travel from the source to the destination. Additionally, we use the re sponse time to describe the amount of time it takes once an attack takes place till it gets resolved.
As depicted in Figure 2 , the maximum bandwidth consumed by DIDMAS is lower compared to that of SNORT. The reduction of the network bandwidth con sumption is due to the use of the mobile agents. The latter move the data analysis to the location of the in trusion data. This makes our proposed system low cost which is definitely a desirable feature for any dis tributed system. Thus, our proposed distributed IDS is much faster than the SNORT system. This can be explained by the fact that the mobile agents operate directly on the host, where an action has to be taken, their response is faster than the system where actions were taken by the central controller, i.e., SNORT. Figure 4 illustrates the response time required by DIDMAS with respect to the attack types.
According to this figure, the detection of all attack types, on average, result in lower response time com pared to that of SNORT.
To sum up, it is clear from the obtained results that the performance of the DIDMAS will not deteriorate too much with the increase in the number of attacks, which is justified by its low bandwidth consumption and quick response time behavior. Also, in case of more machines are connected to the network, the DIDMAS system still withstand the load and swiftly deliver the results.
DIDMAS Performances Assessment. In order to evaluate the performance of a IDS, two interesting metrics are usually of use (Eid et aI., 2008) : the de tection rate and the false positive rate. Indeed, the detection rate is the number of correctly detected in trusions. On the contrary, the false positive rate is the total number of normal instances that were incorrectly considered as attacks. In this respect, the value of the detection rate is expected to be as large as possible, while the value of the false positive rate is expected to be as small as possible. Figure 5 plots the false positive rates against the number of agents. We notice that all the tested attacks produced negligible false positive rates. However, the detection of attack7, i.e. DNS Zone Transfer attack, results in high false positive rate. This event indicates that an outside host requested a zone transfer from an internal DNS server, which can be legitimate traffic from a secondary DNS server, or an attacker gathering infonnation about your domain, thus making the detection rules false positive prone.
According to Figure 6 , we can remark that the false alarm rates of DIDMAS is significantly lower compared to that of SNORT. This result is confirmed by Figure 7 that shows that the detection rates of DIDMAS is by far better than SNORT configuration. Knowing that a main challenge of existing IDS is to decrease the false alann rates (Eid et ai., 2008) , the main benefit of DIDMAS is to lower the false alarm rate, while maintaining a good detection rate.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel distributed mobile agents IDS architecture, called DIDMAS was introduced, which incorporates existing IDS technologies. Indeed, the mobile agents technology is efficient for enhancing security, flexibility and cooperative detective ability of distributed IDS. In this respect, the DIDMAS sys tem addresses the specific limitations described by the central approach. It shows the following advantages:
• Performance Scalability. The mobile agents per form distributed search and analysis. Conse quently, the analysis task related to each intrusion is inherently distributed, reducing the amount of work done per host and removing a single host bottleneck;
• Detection Delay. As we know, the integration of data from distributed detection stations takes a long time. Whenever a mobile agent can migrate to detection stations and analyzes data locally, it will significantly reduce the detection delay;
• Extensibility. DIDMAS guarantees that the system can be extended in a straightforward manner. For example, new rules, actions and task agents can be defined after the DIDMAS is initially deployed, without requiring any changes to the existing set of agents.
The carried out experimental results showed the effectiveness of the introduced approach and high lighted that DIDMAS realizes the scalability of mo bile agent-based approaches, since it reduces the bandwidth consumption as well as the response time. Future issues for the present work mainly concern: (i) The consideration of the anomaly approach using the integration of data mining techniques (Helmer et aI., 2003) .
(ii) Study of the security of the mobile agents themselves, which is one of the important issues that have to be addressed if system is to be deployed in the real environment. In this respect, a mobile agent itself can cause damage to a host or a host can do harm to the mobile agent (Jansen et aI., 1999) .
